The aim of this paper is to present a broad picture and novel aspects of the financial crisis contagion with respect to the stages of crisis contagion and its propagation factors. We employ a pioneering approach to a simulation of the financial crisis contagion by embarking on a qualitative query rather than on empirical data (i.e. by adopting an international investor's perspective by conducting the qualitative query backed by semi-structured interviews with financial markets' participants). Building on modified Kaplan-Meier Survival Plots, we suggest a model for the financial crisis contagion based on international linkages between markets, with particular attention paid to spot vulnerabilities in regulatory frameworks that allowed for the crisis to spread. Simulation results showed that there were several phases of crisis contagion in Europe, and different countries (regions) were contained via different paths, propagated by different factors with not equal intensity. The diversity of European countries' susceptibility is evident not only when comparing advanced markets to the emerging ones, but also within these groups. Hereto, both international investment practitioners, as well as pan European market authorities should analyse with scrutiny the links emerging from the simulation, so that to develop sound and efficient investment strategies or impose tailor-made regulations for financial markets.
introduction
The nascent financial crisis started mainly in USA as a result of several factors: extraordinary boom in the housing market, historically low-interest rates, introduction of financial innovations exploiting the pervasive deregulation, virtual decline of the inflation fear among central banks, thereby relaxing their customary vigilance, strong payment imbalances between countries resulting in global large scale investing, new financial products, e.g. derivatives 1 . International character of these and other factors propagated the crisis to spread gradually during the years 2007-2012, embracing numerous markets worldwide, affecting almost all European countries.
However, not necessarily at the same time and due to the same initiators.
The global crisis exposed the fragility of financial markets' surveillance and regulations that were supposed to shield market participants from the adverse effects of financial distress.
In the face of the nascent crisis new challenges emerged for policymakers and market regulators that served to promote the prevention of similar events of financial distress in the future. This, however, requires a detailed overview of international financial linkages between markets, with particular attention paid to spot vulnerabilities in regulatory frameworks that allowed for the financial crisis contagion to spread. Henceforth, the current research paper attempts to address issues associated with the overconfidence of policy makers and financial supervisory authorities who believed that the financial crises affecting advanced markets would not be transferred also to the emerging ones.
The findings reported in this paper gain in importance for the reason that the current financial crisis escalated tensions between national and supranational financial institutions in Europe which experienced difficulties in delivering stability arrangements for European markets.
According to Fonteyne et al. 2 , it became vital for European authorities to take care of the ways that were believed to propagate the financial turmoil, hence removing that tension. Although recognition of the flawed regulations and cross-market linkages in Europe was suggested several years ago by the pivotal studies of Dermine 3 , Eichengreen et al. 4 , and Véron 5 , the global financial crisis added fuel to academic and political debates about possible prevention from similar events. In addition to this, Véron postulated resolutions for the arrangements managing the financial crisis contagion in the future. With this in mind, the current paper contributes to the fierce, albeit complex debate in political and academic circles by addressing challenges which lie ahead of regulators and policy makers in Europe, and by advising on prudential resolutions for reducing cross-market exposures to the financial crisis contagion. Assuming that different paths of crisis contagion are possible across European countries, and propagation factors vary among particular contagion channels -this paper acknowledges that the choice for macroprudential supervisory systems should account for country-specific factors when dealing with the financial crisis contagion.
This research paper is designed to deal with the notion of the international financial crisis contagion that still remains the least understood phenomenon confusing practitioners associated with financial markets worldwide. As spotted by Rigobon 6 , a lack of comprehensive knowledge of the ways financial crises spread throughout stock markets caused substantial investment losses. These losses were manly incurred by investors diversifying their portfolios with suboptimal choices. Therefore, a study that would shed light on the contagion processes across contemporary financial markets would be of great benefit to global investors. To this point, the current research paper focuses on the financial crisis contagion by adopting stock market practitioners' perspectives. Moreover, the paper attempts to report findings that could contain useful advice for markets' authorities by suggesting an implementation of policies, stock market regulations, stimulus packages and fiscal plans that consider and manage the crossmarket transfers of investment risks.
Finally, the current paper aims to address the question whether financial crises (shock transmission channels) can be predicted. This would provide implications of interest to international investors willing to diversify their portfolios with assets traded on European markets, advising them on trading strategies, hedging possibilities that can be applied in time of the global financial crisis. To this point, the current research paper attempts to broaden the context of the financial crisis contagion to encompass the European markets that constitute international investment hubs attracting large numbers of practitioners. Especially important remains the focus on Central European emerging stock markets, as these investment hubs remain relatively under-researched.
embeddings in literature
The existing body of academic and business literature failed to provide a precise definition of the financial crisis contagion due to the fact that recent financial crises manifested themselves in a multiplicity of diversified factors that propagated shocks across markets. Pericoli and Sbracia 7 presented six definitions of contagions, whereas The World Bank Group specialists distinguish at least three -broad, restrictive and very restrictive definition -not suggesting, however, that any is more precise nor adequate to the nascent financial crisis than the others 8 .
The lack of commonality among financial crises imposed difficulties to investigate financial crisis contagion processes. increased degree of correlation between individual stock markets during the crisis compared to before the crisis period. Gray 13 suggests that the EU-8 were subject to financial contagion, perhaps as a result of a banking sector that had strong cross-border links. However, given the volatility among currencies of smaller economies, the increased bonding, and targeting of the euro, the scope for deflecting shocks through exchange rate adjustments was much reduced. As it transpired, the current global financial crisis was propagated by additional links that previous studies have overlooked. In order to address these omitted links, this research paper attempts to shed light on the channels that facilitated the transmission of the financial crisis across contemporary European markets. In doing so, the paper employs a broader and more insightful approach towards the existing regulatory frameworks and the contemporary linkages between Moreover, popularity of international portfolio diversification is derived from the broad advantages and benefits analysed in a large body of literature devoted to advancing the knowledge of investing in different markets. To this point, the existing reviewed literature rekindled vigorous debate on the purposes for international portfolio diversification. These purposes were boiled down to the two main characteristics of returns achieved by international practitioners. The first motivation was rooted in the return characteristics that guaranteed reduction of investment risks.
The second purpose related to the return enhancement from international portfolio diversification processes with emerging stock markets. Against this backdrop, a set of scholarly contributions by 43 . The latter camp supported the thesis that financial crises could not be predicted -Yuan and Krugman 44 . The following study attempts to reconcile these two opposing camps by providing evidence suggesting that the financial crisis contagion can be predicted, to the extent that facilitates employment of a proper regulatory framework shielding financial markets' participants from the adverse effects of the crises. argued that the financial contagion is transmitted beyond economically fundamental channels and real cross-market links. Therefore, by analyzing a range of propagation factors, this paper is able to distinguish the financial crisis contagion from the cross-market interdependencies.
According to Pasqueriello, Cass and Pavlova, Backus et al., as well as Baxter and Crucini
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, high cross-country correlations in stock markets performance, consumption and productivity may lead to biased and spurious results derived from existing simulation models. In order to address these concerns, inclusion of additional propagation channels in the empirical analysis has been facilitated.
For the purpose of maintaining realism in the empirical framework, the model builds on variables that stem from the qualitative query and theoretical studies rather than tangible data sets.
These variables are contained in Table 1 . Quantitative data failed to deliver a clear picture of the propagation factors that in many cases remained immeasurable, hence overlooked by standard simulation models. The model adopted for the purpose of this paper is presented in Appendix 1 and accompanied by the robustness check. Moreover, the qualitative query factored into the empirical model ascertains timely conclusions highlighting issues that have remained ambiguous for practitioners and academics. The semi-structured interviews complement the quantitative findings with interesting observations and proposals for regulatory resolutions, preventing the occurrence of a financial crisis contagion in the future. Thanks to its methodological framework, this research paper can report findings that constitute principal lessons from the global financial crisis.
propagation factors
The paper looks at a set of different propagation channels following the advice of in stock markets performance, consumption and productivity may lead to biased and spurious results derived from existing simulation models. In order to address these concerns, inclusion of additional propagation channels in the empirical analysis has been facilitated. All propagation factors used in the simulation contains Table 2 in Appendix 2, covering factors' explanations and literature references.
data collection process, research limitations
The main motive underlying the selection of data sample was to focus on the capital markets practitioners' views on financial crisis contagion process, so that to draw sound practical implications for international investors. Hereto, a cross-section of practitioners were selected from a group of 200 respondents who filled in the questionnaires, and subsequently participated in semi-structured interviews, ranging from the sell-side (international brokers, brokerage house analysts, investment advisors), to the buy-side (portfolio, investment funds' managers, stock market analysts, private investors) as well as financial newspapers' columnists, economists, members of supranational financial institutions; for details see Table 3 in Appendix 3. The paper is therefore able to provide greater insight into the investigated matters and ensures obtaining a variety of meaningful opinions. Additionally, the multi-background perspective of the interviewees improves the quality of the results' generalization processes, hence increasing the merit of the research paper. Ultimately, 36 practitioners were selected for the interviews.
The small number of the selected interviewees results from the high-profile selection criteria.
The interviewees were assured of their anonymity and -to protect this -their names were replaced by unique codes.
The semi-structured interviews were aimed at investigating issues raised by the experienced practitioners, who were actively monitoring the global financial crisis and cross- The empirical model is derived from medical research and, to date, has not been applied to economics or finance. However, due to its enhanced capabilities it was chosen to analyze contagion processes in Europe. The current empirical framework is rooted in the modified model of the Kaplan-Meier Survival Plots utilized commonly in cancer research. To this point, a more satisfying approach would be an adoption of the Cox Hazard Model. However, the latter is accompanied by the demanding assumptions that cannot be met when utilizing the data from a small number of questionnaires (data sample for this kind of methodology might be too small to make sound conclusions or extrapolate findings, however, this was the pioneer attempt to use it in for such investigation). Due to the innovativeness and complexity of the methodological approach, discussion of the empirics and data treatment is shifted to Appendix 1.
results
simulation results
The graphs ( Figure 1) were generated using equations [1] [2] . The graphs show delineated timing of the financial crisis contagion across the selected European markets. The "At Risk"
Indicator informs about the risk of being affected by the progressing financial crisis. This indicator takes values from 0 to 1. The higher values (above 0.4000) of the "At Risk" Indicator suggest that the chosen markets are more susceptible to the financial crisis at the particular phases of contagion t. There are twenty constant time intervals that denote the phases of the financial crisis contagion. A visual inspection of this figure reveals that Ireland, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Germany, France and Sweden were the first economies/markets to be flagged "at risk" of being affected by the financial crisis contagion triggered in the UK. However, Sweden positively distinguished itself from these markets as the empirical findings indicated a relatively small risk of transferring the financial crisis to Sweden. Norway also appeared to be crisis-resistant were last to be reached by the financial crisis contagion.
The strength of the propagation factors in the subsequent phases of the financial crisis contagion was calculated based on the equations [3] [4] [5] [6] . The maximum value = 1 means that the chosen factor acted as the strongest link propagating the financial crisis across the markets. The minimum value = 0 means that the chosen factor was inactive at the particular phase (t + n) of the financial crisis contagion. The quantitative simulation brought forward important conclusions. It turned out that the contagion channels were being transformed throughout the process of the financial crisis contagion. In the initial phase of the analyzed contagion, the crisis was spread through regulatory European emerging stock markets were affected by the simulated financial crisis through equity and debt market relationships, and the retrenchment of the investment capital inflow coupled with negative opinions about the region expressed by rating agencies. However, formerly affected countries -Italy, Spain and Portugal displayed different crisis transmission carriers.
In this case, the simulated contagion among advanced stock markets in Western Europe was propagated by macroeconomic conditions and trade relationships. Nevertheless, equity and debt markets played equally significant roles in disseminating the simulated financial crisis.
general findings
The findings presented in a graphical form call for an active monetary policy that might The weakening of the financial crisis contagion -reported for the equity, derivatives and debt markets in Central Europe -could be explained by the sound regulatory framework employed in the leading stock markets of Central Europe: Austria, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia.
The changes in regulations of those financial markets were introduced after previous episodes of financial crises. The negative consequences of neglecting the risk of complex structures of the currency options and derivative products would curb creditworthiness and investment plans of numerous companies involved in trading currency options during the current financial crisis. With this in mind, the study postulates an introduction of additional protection mechanisms to European capital markets. These mechanisms would shield investors, financial institutions and investee companies from the risks associated with using currency options and other derivatives.
conclusions
The current paper -combining quantitative and qualitative research methods -has painted the picture of the contemporary European financial markets with particular attention paid to the existing cross-market linkages, vulnerabilities, systemic risks and flawed regulations that altogether constituted a group of factors propagating the financial crisis contagion. In doing so, the paper reported findings that could be useful for practitioners associated with European financial markets as they have provided insights into the influence of the global financial crisis on the international portfolio diversification and functioning of capital markets in Europe.
Moreover, the paper provided implications for policy-makers and financial market regulators advising on the ways of curbing the financial crisis contagion.
Simulation results, on contrary to the previous analyses, models presenting one-, two-or at most a three-stage contagion process, showed that there were several phases of crisis contagion in Europe, and different countries (regions) were contained via different paths, propagated by different factors with not equal intensity. The diversity of European countries' susceptibility is evident not only when comparing advanced markets to the emerging ones, but also within these groups. Hereto, both, international investment practitioners, as well as pan European market authorities should analyse with scrutiny the links emerging from the simulation, so that to develop sound and efficient investment strategies or impose tailor-made regulations for financial markets.
Hence, the simulation highlighted the importance of implementing a cross-European stock markets' surveillance that would ultimately make equity investment in Europe less challenging The findings also delivered important implications for the capabilities and features of the warning signal systems that could be implemented to stem the ensuing financial contagion before it unraveled to affect financial markets in Europe. At this point, the paper postulated mapping European regions that were exposed to the highlighted contagion channels. This would involve evaluation of cross-country connections within specific regions and among a set of these regions.
The financial market authorities, both in emerging and advanced European economies should understand the functioning of these connections and factors on which specific cross-country and cross-regional networks depended. With this end in view, a behavior of certain propagation factors would produce early warning signals and prepare authorities or other network members to counteract.
As far as implications for international practitioners are concerned, the paper advises on several trading strategies that can be applied to the global financial crisis. First, it emerged from the qualitative query that practitioners associated with European stock markets should focus on alternative equity investments in innovative companies. Second, investors should not limit their attention to monitoring debt markets only. Although the paper argues that bond markets deliver information about investment risks and economic stability of host countries, this information can The simulated findings highlighted the relationship between the financial development of a particular market and its susceptibility to the financial crisis contagion. In order to address this concern, the paper advises market regulators of European markets to implement financial instruments that could smooth consumption and ensure investment capital flows. What emerged from the findings was that better developed financial markets can absorb shocks transmitted through the equity, debt or derivative markets and investment capital flows. This requires local central banks to operate under greater independency and policymakers to ensure increased contribution of the monetary policy to macroeconomic stability. Nonetheless, the authorities should not be too aggressive in the process of enhancing macroeconomic stability, but must have access to a wide range of financial instruments used against negative effects caused by the contagion.
Another policy lesson that stems from the reported findings refers to better coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities. In the blend of the anti-crisis policies, monetary and fiscal regulators cannot act independently as this would lead to costly conflicts and adjustment of their policies while accommodating shocks propagated by macroeconomic factors and currency exchange volatility. Furthermore, the regulators ought to envisage additional and more insightful measures supported by monitoring of the quality of the monetary and fiscal policy.
As far as other policy lessons derived from the findings are concerned, it became apparent that trade relationships -unlike equity markets -were limited to fuelling the financial crisis contagion only within a narrow group of advanced economies in Europe. Therefore, the regulatory perimeter should be shifted to capture speculative attacks in stock markets that trigger cross-border spillover effects rather than issues related to international trade. This paper supports the idea of the capital cushions that would soften the negative effects of the international financial contagion. The paper advises European authorities to set up a pooled financial aid that could be used in times of the global financial crisis. However, given the severity and abruptness of the current financial crisis coupled with the high indebtedness of European countries, the responsibility for providing financial aid should be granted to supranational institutions such as the European Commission or the International Monetary Fund.
appendiX 1. simulation model
The model adopted for the purpose of this paper appears as follows:
The simulation S" is based on the modified model of Kaplan and Maier, Costella and Brown et al. who developed an estimate of the survival function 54 : "Ŝ". In this case, the model estimates two components of the vector derived from the right-censored data (questionnaires). Since the data is of qualitative character, the choice for the Kaplan-Meier Survival Model remains optimal as its methodology requires minimum assumptions but develops strong interpretive powers for the observed variables "Y" and "X". The first component of the vector -"Y n,t " measures the strength of each propagation factor at a given time "t". The second component of the simulation ranks European countries in accordance with the timing "t" of the financial crisis contagion. Ultimately, the financial crisis contagion processes are limited to "n" stages that contain most frequently selected countries ordered by the "k th " rank in the sequence. As far as the modified Kaplan-Meier Model is concerned, "t" is re-written to "t(i)" denoting the ith ordered wave of the financial crisis contagion and "d(i)" denotes the number of the effected countries/active propagation factors recorded at the wave "n" rewritten to time "t". If "n(i)" is the total number of all countries flagged as crisis-affected at time "t", or propagation factors becoming active during wave "n", then "n(i-)" denotes the sum of all countries flagged at risk before the ith ordered wave of the financial crisis contagion. Accordingly, "n(i-) encompasses all propagation factors that became active prior the occurrence of the ith wave.
Transferred from the medical studies into the field of finance and applied economics,
The Modified Kaplan-Meier Survival Model becomes useful in evaluating whether and when the crisis contagion affects particular countries. However, this model fails to assess how each of the sample countries is affected by the spreading contagion. Therefore, the simulation consists of a vector that separately utilizes the Kaplan-Meier Model to both the propagation factors and countries.
Furthermore, in order to analyze whether one group of countries is at greater risk of the financial crisis than the other groups, this paper is equipped with additional empirical analyses that constitute the robustness check for the Kaplan-Meier Methodology:
Hereto, the robustness check of the simulation "S RC " is built upon a vector of two equations:
"Y n,t " and "X n,t ". The first component of the vector -"Y n,t " measures the strength of each propagation factor "V n,t " at a given time "t". Computation of this measure is based on questionnaires, in which the respondents selected factors of the strongest significance at a given stage "t" of the financial crisis contagion, whereas "i" denotes the number of ticks (with maximum value of "y") for each variable and "n" encompasses all existing options (variables = propagation factors available). A scaler of "β" is introduced to the equation (4) so "Y n,t " can take values from 0 to 1 in accordance with the significance of the selected factors. "θ t " is a nonnegative parameter that eliminates measurement errors. The second component of the simulation is derived from the order statistics "Z k Z,t " which ranks European countries in accordance with the timing "t" of the financial crisis contagion to affect selected countries "z". Ultimately, they are assigned to "n" stages that contain most frequently selected countries ordered by the "k th " rank in the sequence "W k,t " generated from the "i" choices of the respondents.
Both the model and the robustness check are built on the assumptions that the intervals between stages/waves of the financial crisis contagion are constant and unspecified for their duration in time.
Hereto, the purpose of the robustness check is limited to rank the selected countries in accordance to their place in a domino effect caused by the global financial crisis. Since the empirical simulation is rooted in the qualitative query, this paper builds upon surveys and semi-structured interviews with stock market practitioners and experts possessing extensive knowledge about European financial markets, applied economics and finance. Combining both research methods enhances the models' ability to mirror reality and deliver practical findings for the policymakers and stock market participants. The questionnaires utilized in the models were sent in April and May 2012 to the targeted experts who displayed the required knowledge and understanding of the cross-market linkages in Europe, functioning of European financial markets and the current economic situation in Europe. The respondents were asked to assign European economies to the delineated stages of the financial crisis contagion. The respondents were also asked to assign the propagation factors that transmitted the financial turmoil between the ranked countries. In case of the robustness check, the strength of the propagation factors was calculated upon the cumulative frequency of instances at which they were selected for a given stage. Similar procedure applied for assigning countries to the specific stages of the global financial crisis -economies that received the maximum number of ticks were included in the corresponding groups. All ambiguous issues that arouse from the questionnaires were clarified with the participant in a timely manner. An example of the questionnaire is enclosed in Appendix 4.
European countries "z" (Equation 5 ) are presented in Table 1 . Additionally, Table 1 
propagation factors
V1 Equity Market
The market in which shares are issued and traded, either through exchanges or overthe-counter markets; global investors diversify their portfolios with international shares, therefore shocks contribute to the capital flows throughout countriesPasqueriello (2007), Cass and Pavlova (2004) , Backus et al. (1992) as well as Baxter and Crucini (1993) , Girard and Rahman (2002) Eichengreen et al. (1996) , Goldstein (1998) and Gerlach and Smets (1995) , Glick and Rose (1999) , 
data sample
